One Person, One Vote Bill

At a Glance

  • Caps all political contributions at $1,000 per candidate per election cycle
  • Creates a 6:1 small donor matching fund to amplify ordinary voters
  • Requires corporate and union political spending be approved by shareholders or members
  • Mandates real-time disclosure of all political spending and donor identities
  • Restructures the FEC to five members to end partisan enforcement deadlock
One Person, One Vote Bill

The influence of money in politics has eroded the foundation of American democracy, allowing wealthy individuals and organizations to exert outsized influence while ordinary citizens' voices are drowned out. Supreme Court decisions, most notably Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission[1] (2010), have enabled unlimited independent expenditures by corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals, creating a system where a small number of major donors can shape elections and policy priorities.

The consequences have transformed American politics. Outside spending has exploded, with super PACs and dark money groups now integral to most major campaigns[2]. A tiny donor class dominates political giving, with the wealthiest families routinely outspending the combined contributions of millions of small donors. Candidates without access to wealthy networks face significant barriers to mounting competitive campaigns, narrowing the pool of potential leaders.

This flood of money has also transformed how members of Congress spend their time. Both parties instruct members to spend hours each day fundraising from call centers near the Capitol—time taken directly from legislative work, constituent service, and oversight responsibilities. Elected representatives have become, in effect, part-time legislators and full-time fundraisers, with success in meeting fundraising targets determining committee assignments and leadership positions.

Public trust has collapsed accordingly. Americans overwhelmingly believe elected officials prioritize the interests of big donors over ordinary constituents, and trust in the federal government has fallen to historic lows[3]. This perception fuels cynicism, suppresses civic participation, and undermines the legitimacy of democratic institutions.

To restore the principle that every voter's voice should be weighed equally, this legislation takes an approach designed to survive constitutional scrutiny under current Supreme Court precedent. Direct contributions to candidates and committees are capped at $1,000 per election cycle—well within Congress's established authority under Buckley v. Valeo. Because Citizens United prohibits outright bans on independent expenditures, the bill instead requires corporate and union political spending to be approved by shareholders or dues-paying members before disbursement, tightens coordination rules so that spending directed or arranged by candidates is treated as a regulable contribution rather than protected independent speech, mandates comprehensive real-time disclosure of all political spending so voters know who is trying to influence them, creates a 6:1 small donor matching system that amplifies ordinary voices without restricting anyone's speech, and reforms the Federal Election Commission to end the structural deadlock that has rendered campaign finance enforcement nearly nonexistent[4]. Political participation should be a civic act, not a financial transaction. In a democracy, influence should flow from votes—not dollars.

Problems the Bill Aims to Solve

Wealthy Donors Have Captured the Political Process. When a handful of billionaires and wealthy families can outspend millions of ordinary citizens combined, elections become contests of wealth rather than ideas. Candidates become responsive to those who fund their campaigns rather than those who cast votes. This concentration of political spending among the few fundamentally undermines the democratic principle of political equality and transforms representative government into government by and for donors.

Unlimited Spending Has Overwhelmed Democratic Participation. The Citizens United decision and subsequent rulings enabled unlimited political spending through super PACs and dark money organizations. Outside spending now rivals or exceeds candidate spending in competitive races, meaning voters face not just candidates but shadow campaigns funded by anonymous wealthy interests. When spending has no limits, those with the most money inevitably dominate, regardless of the merit of their positions or the breadth of their support.

Members of Congress Spend More Time Fundraising Than Governing. Both parties instruct members to spend significant portions of each day—often four hours or more—calling donors rather than working on legislation, meeting with constituents, or conducting oversight. This fundraising treadmill diverts elected officials from the responsibilities voters entrusted to them. When raising money becomes the primary activity of public servants, the quality of governance inevitably suffers, and qualified candidates unwilling to become full-time fundraisers are deterred from seeking office.

Dark Money Has Eroded Transparency and Accountability. Groups that do not disclose their donors now spend hundreds of millions on elections, preventing voters from knowing who is attempting to influence their choices. This secrecy enables wealthy interests to shape elections without accountability, opens doors to foreign influence, and allows corruption to flourish in darkness. Democratic self-governance requires that citizens know who is trying to persuade them and why.

Public Trust in Government Has Collapsed. Americans overwhelmingly believe that elected officials care more about donors than constituents and that Congress prioritizes the interests of big spenders. This perception—rooted in observable reality—has driven trust in government to historic lows. When citizens conclude that their voice doesn't matter regardless of how they vote, democratic legitimacy erodes, civic participation declines, and the social contract that binds citizens to their government frays.

The Federal Election Commission Is Structurally Incapable of Enforcement. The FEC's six-member structure—evenly split between parties by design—ensures that enforcement actions require bipartisan agreement, which rarely occurs on consequential matters. Commissioners routinely deadlock along party lines[5], blocking investigations, dismissing complaints, and allowing violations to go unpunished. The agency tasked with enforcing campaign finance law has become, in effect, an institution designed to prevent its own mission from being carried out. Without structural reform, any new campaign finance rules will be as unenforceable as the existing ones.

The Current System Violates Democratic Equality. The principle of "one person, one vote" is meaningless if some citizens can amplify their political voice a million-fold through spending. Democracy requires not just equal voting rights but meaningful political equality—the assurance that citizens have roughly equal ability to influence their government. A system where billionaires can single-handedly shape elections while ordinary voters' contributions are rendered insignificant betrays this foundational principle and transforms democracy into plutocracy.

One Person, One Vote Act

120th Congress, 2nd Session

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

Sec. 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "One Person, One Vote Act."

Sec. 2. DEFINITIONS.

For purposes of this Act—

  1. (1) CONTRIBUTION.—The term "contribution" has the meaning given that term in section 301(8) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101(8)), and shall additionally include any transfer of funds, donation, expenditure, or in-kind contribution made for the purpose of influencing a Federal election.
  2. (2) COVERED ENTITY.—The term "covered entity" means any individual, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, labor union, trade association, political action committee, super PAC, 527 organization, or any other organization or entity of any kind.
  3. (3) ELECTION CYCLE.—The term "election cycle" means the period beginning on the day after the date of the most recent general election for the office sought and ending on the date of the next general election.
  4. (4) SMALL DOLLAR CONTRIBUTION.—The term "small dollar contribution" means a contribution of two hundred dollars or less made by an individual who is a citizen or lawful permanent resident.
  5. (5) COMMISSION.—The term "Commission" means the Federal Election Commission as restructured under Section 8.
  6. (6) INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE.—The term "independent expenditure" means an expenditure for a communication expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate that is not made in coordination with a candidate, a candidate's authorized committee, or their agents.
  7. (7) COORDINATED EXPENDITURE.—The term "coordinated expenditure" means an expenditure that meets any of the coordination standards set forth in Section 5.
  8. (8) COVERED ORGANIZATION.—The term "covered organization" means any corporation, limited liability company, partnership, labor union, trade association, or tax-exempt organization that makes or intends to make political expenditures exceeding ten thousand dollars in the aggregate during an election cycle.

Sec. 3. CONTRIBUTION LIMITS.

  1. (1) PER-CANDIDATE LIMIT.—No covered entity may make direct contributions to any single candidate for Federal office in excess of one thousand dollars per election cycle.
  2. (2) PER-COMMITTEE LIMIT.—No covered entity may make direct contributions to any single political committee in excess of one thousand dollars per election cycle.
  3. (3) AGGREGATE LIMIT.—No covered entity may make direct contributions to all candidates and committees in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars per election cycle in the aggregate.
  4. (4) COORDINATED EXPENDITURES TREATED AS CONTRIBUTIONS.—Any coordinated expenditure, as defined in Section 2(7) and determined under Section 5, shall be treated as a direct contribution to the candidate with whom the expenditure was coordinated and shall count against the limits established in this section.

Sec. 4. SHAREHOLDER AND MEMBER APPROVAL OF POLITICAL EXPENDITURES.

  1. (1) CORPORATE EXPENDITURES.—No corporation may make political expenditures exceeding ten thousand dollars in the aggregate during an election cycle from its general treasury unless—
    1. (a) the board of directors has adopted a political expenditure policy by majority vote, disclosed in the corporation's annual proxy statement;
    2. (b) shareholders have approved the aggregate amount authorized for political expenditures by majority vote at the most recent annual meeting or by written consent; and
    3. (c) each individual expenditure exceeding fifty thousand dollars has been separately approved by the board and disclosed to shareholders within forty-eight hours.
  2. (2) UNION EXPENDITURES.—No labor union may make political expenditures exceeding ten thousand dollars in the aggregate during an election cycle from dues or general funds unless—
    1. (a) the union's governing body has adopted a political expenditure policy approved by a majority of dues-paying members through a vote conducted by secret ballot; and
    2. (b) any dues-paying member who objects to political expenditures may direct that a pro rata share of the member's dues be excluded from political spending, with the union providing an annual opt-out mechanism and written notice of the right to opt out.
  3. (3) TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AND TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS.—No trade association or organization described in section 501(c)(4), 501(c)(5), or 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code may make political expenditures exceeding ten thousand dollars in the aggregate during an election cycle unless—
    1. (a) the organization has disclosed its intent to make political expenditures to all members or donors contributing more than one thousand dollars annually; and
    2. (b) political expenditures are funded only from contributions specifically designated for political purposes.
  4. (4) ANNUAL DISCLOSURE.—Each covered organization that makes political expenditures shall file with the Commission and publish on its website an annual report listing the total amount of political expenditures, each expenditure exceeding one thousand dollars, and the authorization under which the expenditure was made.
  5. (5) SEPARATE SEGREGATED FUNDS.—A corporation or labor union may continue to establish a separate segregated fund for political contributions, provided all contributions to the fund are voluntary and the fund complies with the contribution limits established in Section 3.

Sec. 5. COORDINATION STANDARDS.

  1. (1) CONDUCT STANDARD.—An expenditure shall be treated as coordinated with a candidate if the expenditure is made—
    1. (a) at the request, suggestion, or direction of the candidate, the candidate's authorized committee, or any agent thereof;
    2. (b) pursuant to any general or particular understanding with the candidate, the candidate's authorized committee, or any agent thereof regarding the content, timing, location, intended audience, or volume of the communication;
    3. (c) after substantial discussion or strategic consultation between the spender or the spender's agents and the candidate, the candidate's authorized committee, or any agent thereof, regarding the candidate's campaign plans, needs, messaging strategy, or advertising schedule, whether or not the specific expenditure was discussed; or
    4. (d) by a person who, within the preceding twenty-four months, served as an employee, consultant, or contractor of the candidate's campaign or any committee controlled by the candidate, unless the person has maintained a complete firewall certified to the Commission.
  2. (2) CONTENT STANDARD.—An expenditure shall be treated as coordinated with a candidate if the resulting communication—
    1. (a) republishes, disseminates, or distributes campaign materials produced by the candidate's authorized committee; or
    2. (b) uses footage, audio, images, polling data, or opposition research that was created by or for the candidate's campaign and made available, directly or indirectly, to the spender.
  3. (3) COMMON VENDOR STANDARD.—An expenditure shall be treated as coordinated with a candidate if the spender and the candidate's authorized committee use a common vendor or consultant who provides strategic advice, media buying, polling, or fundraising services to both, unless both parties certify to the Commission that a complete informational firewall has been maintained and the vendor provides a written attestation of compliance.
  4. (4) REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION.—An expenditure by an entity that shares a current or recent officer, director, or senior employee with a candidate's campaign or authorized committee shall be presumed to be a coordinated expenditure. The presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence of a functioning informational firewall.
  5. (5) EFFECT OF COORDINATION.—Any expenditure determined to be a coordinated expenditure shall be treated as a contribution to the candidate and subject to the limits established in Section 3.

Sec. 6. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.

  1. (1) Any covered entity that makes political expenditures exceeding two hundred dollars in the aggregate during an election cycle shall file disclosure reports with the Commission.
  2. (2) Reports shall include the identity, address, and employer of each contributor, the amount and date of each expenditure, and the candidate or committee to which it was directed.
  3. (3) Any contribution or expenditure exceeding five hundred dollars made within twenty days of an election shall be reported within twenty-four hours.
  4. (4) The Commission shall maintain a searchable, publicly accessible electronic database of all disclosures, updated in real time as reports are received.
  5. (5) DONOR DISCLOSURE FOR INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES.—Any covered organization that makes independent expenditures exceeding ten thousand dollars in the aggregate during an election cycle shall disclose to the Commission, within twenty-four hours, the identity of each person who contributed more than ten thousand dollars to the organization during the preceding twelve months.
  6. (6) DISCLAIMER REQUIREMENTS.—Any communication funded by independent expenditures exceeding ten thousand dollars shall include a clear and conspicuous disclaimer identifying the organization responsible for the communication, the names of the top three donors to the organization during the preceding twelve months, and a statement that the communication was not authorized by any candidate.
  7. (7) TRANSFER DISCLOSURE.—Any organization that transfers funds to another organization that then makes political expenditures shall disclose such transfer to the Commission if the transferring organization knew or had reason to know that the funds would be used for political expenditures. Transfers structured to obscure the original source of funds used for political expenditures shall be treated as a violation of this Act.

Sec. 7. PROHIBITION ON FOREIGN NATIONAL POLITICAL SPENDING.

  1. (1) Section 319(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act (52 U.S.C. 30121(a)) is amended to additionally prohibit any foreign national from making any disbursement for an electioneering communication or any communication that promotes, supports, attacks, or opposes a candidate for Federal office.
  2. (2) Any corporation making a political expenditure shall certify to the Commission that no foreign national or foreign entity directed, controlled, or financed such expenditure.
  3. (3) Any covered organization with foreign ownership of fifteen percent or more, or with a foreign national serving as a principal officer or on the board of directors with decision-making authority over political expenditures, shall be prohibited from making political expenditures.

Sec. 8. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION REFORM.

  1. (1) RESTRUCTURING.—The Federal Election Commission shall be restructured to consist of five members, no more than two of whom may be affiliated with the same political party. The fifth member shall serve as Chair and shall not be registered with any political party.
  2. (2) APPOINTMENT.—Members shall be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for staggered six-year terms. The Chair shall be selected by the President from among individuals with demonstrated nonpartisan experience in law enforcement, election administration, or judicial service, confirmed by a three-fifths vote of the Senate.
  3. (3) DEADLOCK PREVENTION.—Three members shall constitute a quorum. Decisions shall be made by majority vote. If the Commission fails to act on a complaint within one hundred twenty days, the Office of General Counsel shall be authorized to pursue the matter independently, subject to judicial review.
  4. (4) INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY.—The Commission shall have full subpoena authority, the power to conduct audits and investigations on its own initiative, and the authority to impose civil penalties without prior referral to the Department of Justice for amounts not exceeding five hundred thousand dollars per violation.
  5. (5) RANDOM AUDIT PROGRAM.—The Commission shall establish a program of random audits covering not fewer than ten percent of all committees required to file reports under Federal law each election cycle.

Sec. 9. SMALL DONOR MATCHING PROGRAM.

  1. (1) There is established within the Treasury the Freedom to Vote Fund for providing matching funds for small dollar contributions.
  2. (2) Each small dollar contribution to a qualifying candidate shall be matched at a ratio of six dollars in Federal funds for every one dollar contributed, up to a maximum match of one thousand two hundred dollars per contributor per candidate per election cycle.
  3. (3) A qualifying candidate must raise not fewer than one thousand small dollar contributions from residents of the State or district and agree to total spending limits set by the Commission.
  4. (4) The Fund shall be financed by a surcharge of two and one-half percent on any criminal or civil fine, penalty, or settlement paid to the Federal Government in excess of one million dollars.

Sec. 10. ENFORCEMENT AND PENALTIES.

  1. (1) The Commission shall have jurisdiction to investigate and enforce violations of this Act with subpoena authority and the power to impose civil penalties.
  2. (2) Any covered entity that violates contribution limits shall be subject to a civil penalty equal to three times the excess contribution or fifty thousand dollars, whichever is greater.
  3. (3) Any covered organization that makes political expenditures without the required shareholder, member, or donor authorization under Section 4 shall be subject to a civil penalty equal to two hundred percent of the unauthorized expenditure.
  4. (4) Any covered organization that fails to comply with disclosure requirements under Sections 4 or 6 shall be subject to a civil penalty of ten thousand dollars per day of non-compliance.
  5. (5) Any person who structures transfers or uses intermediary organizations to evade the disclosure requirements of this Act shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than the amount of the expenditure and not more than three times such amount.
  6. (6) Any person who knowingly and willfully violates this Act shall be subject to a fine of not more than two hundred fifty thousand dollars, imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.

Sec. 11. EFFECTIVE DATE.

  1. (1) This Act shall take effect on January 1 of the first calendar year beginning not less than one hundred eighty days after the date of enactment.
  2. (2) The restructuring of the Federal Election Commission under Section 8 shall be completed not later than one year after enactment, with current commissioners serving until their successors are confirmed.

Sources

  1. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-205.pdf
  2. Federal Election Commission, "Statistical Summary of 24-Month Campaign Activity of the 2023-2024 Election Cycle." https://www.fec.gov/updates/statistical-summary-of-24-month-campaign-activity-of-the-2023-2024-election-cycle/
  3. Pew Research Center, "Public Trust in Government: 1958-2024." https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/06/24/public-trust-in-government-1958-2024/
  4. U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Campaign Finance: Federal Framework, Agency Roles and Responsibilities, and Perspectives," GAO-20-66R. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-66r
  5. Congressional Research Service, "Deadlocked Votes Among Members of the Federal Election Commission," Report R40779. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R40779